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Law Enforcement and Data Privacy:
A Forward-Loolong Approach
The Edward Snowden revelations illustrated the ramifications of a
domestic and international legal infrastructure that failed to keep up with
technological advancements. The USA PATRIOT Act and other national
security laws were ill-equipped to handle developments in bulk data collection.
This failure is increasingly evident in the law enforcement context as well.
Cloud computing and encryption have fundamentally unsettled the
assumptions underlying the existing warrant regime.
The privacy concerns that crystallized in the wake of the Snowden
disclosures have had ripple effects beyond the national security context. Private
companies, NGOs, and foreign governments reacted forcefully to the
revelations, effecting new laws and policies to shield information from the
National Security Agency. A defining feature of this new era is the increasingly
contentious relationship between the U.S. government and major U.S.
technology companies, such as Apple and Google.' Foreign customers,
suspicious of U.S. technology companies' relationship with the government,
have threatened to switch to local Internet providers. The commercial
implications of such a switch would be severe. By some estimates, losing
business abroad could cost U.S. technology companies over one hundred
1. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., Apple and Other Companies Tangle with U.S. over Data Access,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2o15/o9/o8/us/politics/apple-and
-other-tech-companies-tangle-with-us-over-access-to-data.html [http://perma.cc/SQL9
-WHLL]; Cory Bennett, Apple Couldn't Comply with Warrant Because of Encryption, HILL
(Sept. 8, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/252896-apple-rebuffed-warrant
-because-of-encryption [http://perma.cc/9YLP-7F72]; Michael B. Farrell, FBI, DOJ Want
Tech Industry To Find Workaround to 'Warrant-Proof Encryption, CHRISTIAN SCI.
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eighty billion dollars in the market for cloud computing.' Accordingly, these
companies have abandoned their longstanding policies of quiet cooperation
with Washington. Instead, they now seek to outdo one another in
demonstrating their independence from the government and their
commitment to consumer privacy. For instance, Microsoft, with the support of
many others in the industry, is in the midst of litigation challenging the
territorial scope of U.S. warrants.' Apple and Google recently announced that
their new systems would encrypt content on mobile phones in a manner that
makes it impossible for the companies themselves to access the data on locked
phones.' By encrypting content so heavily as to render warrants ineffective,
this policy poses a direct obstacle to law enforcement's ability to access
necessary electronic content.
In conjunction with new technologies that make such noncompliance
possible, this acrimony clarifies the need to update the existing warrant
doctrine. This Comment aims to begin that process. It rethinks the reach of
warrants in light of cloud computing and proposes a legislative mechanism to
ensure the continued effectiveness of warrants given developments in
encryption technology. In doing so, this Comment strives to introduce better
incentives and align the numerous interests implicated in data regulation. In
order to succeed in the long run, any successful warrant regime must account
for not only the government's interest in law enforcement, but also the
individual consumer's interest in privacy and the commercial interests of
technology companies.
Part I surveys the problems that recent developments have exposed in the
current legal regime. Part II argues that in an era of cloud computing, hinging
law enforcement access to data on its physical location increasingly makes little
sense. Part III explores how encryption renders even clearly valid warrants
insufficient and recommends legislative reform to address this impending
reality.
2. Claire Cain Miller, Google Pushes Back Against Data Localization, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Jan. 24,
2014, 6:28 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2ol4/ol/24/google-pushes-back-against-data
-localization [http://perma.cc/N9DK-6A76].
3. Dominic Rushe, Tech Companies Join Microsoft in Email Warrant Case Against US
Government, GuARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2ol4/dec
/15/microsoft-email-warrant-lawsuit-tech-media-companies-join [http://perma.cc/5WXU
-6CXB]; Alex Ely, Second Circuit Argument in the Microsoft-Ireland Case: An Overview,
LAWFARE (Sept. io, 2015, 5:o8 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/second-circuit-oral
-argument-microsoft-ireland-case-overview [http://perma.cc/CQ3H-MQ3M].
4. See infra text accompanying note 40.
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I. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVACY: THE ECPA'S OUTDATED
APPROACH
Since 1986, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) has
regulated law enforcement's ability to access electronic data. Its second section,
the Stored Communications Act (SCA), stipulates that providers must disclose
the content of electronic communications held in an account for more than 18o
days if the government produces a subpoena or court order.s If such
communication has been stored for fewer than 18o days, the government must
obtain a search warrant.6 Whereas the Fourth Amendment "probable cause"
standard is required for a warrant, the government can obtain a subpoena or
court order if it can establish reasonable grounds to believe that the contents
are relevant to a criminal investigation-a lower standard." As is readily
apparent, the ECPA is sorely outdated in terms of the kinds and scope of
privacy protection it offers. The distinctions drawn in the ECPA between
communications stored for more or less than 18o days are vestiges of a bygone
era, and many have argued that they should be abolished.8 Yet as a recent
Second Circuit case illustrates, the ECPA's problems go deeper than these
artificial lines.
In December 2013, federal prosecutors obtained a warrant for emails
associated with an account held by Microsoft. Because much of the email
content was stored on servers in Ireland, Microsoft challenged the warrant,
arguing that it could not be applied extraterritorially. Microsoft pointed to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as the statutory presumption
against extraterritoriality.9 It argued that in order to obtain the email content,
the United States must go through the bilateral process established in the
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between the United States and
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b) (2012); see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41733,
PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT 41 (2012).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
7. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
8. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING
VALUES 66 (2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big-data-privacy
reportS.1.14_finalprint.pdf [http://perma.cc/WC4L-GRWR] (recommending that the
ECPA's "archaic distinctions between email left unread or over a certain age" be revised so as
to better track protections accorded to content in the physical world).
g. In re Warrant To Search a Certain Email Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), argued, No. 14-2985-CV (2d Cir. Sept. 9,
2015).
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Ireland."o Under that mechanism, Irish courts would determine the validity of
the request pursuant to their own local law before turning over data to U.S.
authorities - a notoriously slow and cumbersome process." Yet in In re
Warrant To Search a Certain Email Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., the court rejected this argument, declaring that, under the SCA, U.S.
Internet service providers served with a warrant must produce information
"within [their] control" regardless of where it is stored." Microsoft appealed,
and a decision from the Second Circuit is expected in the coming months."
Regardless of the outcome, the case highlights the limitations of the SCA,
particularly the uncertainty about its extraterritorial application and scope. The
statute was devised for a world in which the Internet was predominantly an
American system. Yet in the past decades, the Internet has become thoroughly
global, both in terms of its users and infrastructure. The SCA has failed to keep
up with this transformation. In response, a bipartisan group of senators has
attempted to address this deficiency by proposing the Law Enforcement Access
to Data Stored Abroad Act (LEADS Act).' The LEADS Act requires a warrant
for any access to communications content" and stipulates that warrants served
1o. Id. at 474. MLATs are agreements between countries that have the status of international
law and allow governments to exchange evidence and information with other jurisdictions
in order to facilitate criminal investigations and prosecutions. See Drew Mitnick, The Urgent
Need for MLAT Reform, ACCESS BLOG (Sept. 12, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.accessnow.org
/blog/2o14/o9/12/the-urgent-needs-for-mlat-reform [http://perma.cc/6M7K-QWKL]. The
United States has entered into over sixty MLATs. See Bureau of Int'l Narcotics & Law Enft
Affairs, 2012 INCSR: Treaties & Agreements, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www
.state.gov/j/inVrls/nrcrpt/2o12/vol2/18411o.htm [http://perma.cc/B9AP-X3H7].
ii. The White House estimates it takes ten months for MLAT requests to be fulfilled; others
put the number much higher. PRESIDENT'S REVIEw GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS
TECHS., LIBERTY & SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 227 (2013) [hereinafter LIBERTY &
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD].
12. In re Warrant, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 474.
13. See Joe Palazzolo, Microsoft Email Case Tests Power ofSearch Warrants, WALL STREET J. (Sept.
7, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-email-case-tests-power-of-search-warrant
-1441660355 [http://perma.cc/UM48-3GKC].
14. S. 512, xx4 th Cong. (2015); see Nancy Scola, Senate's New Overseas-Email Protection Act Gets
Mixed Reviews, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/the-switch/wp/2014/o9/18/senates-new-overseas-email-protection-act-gets-mixed-reviews
[http://perma.cc/S9TS-PZ7L].
s. This requirement follows from the Sixth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Warshak, in
which the court reasoned that, because "email is analogous to a letter or a phone call,"
individuals "enjoy[] a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of emails 'that are
stored with, or sent or received through, a commercial ISP.' 631 F-3d 266, 286-88 (6th Cir.
2010). Warshak, in conjunction with pressure from civil society, played a crucial role in
ensuring that the warrant requirement made it into reform proposals introduced in
subsequent years, such as the LEADS Act.
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to U.S. providers cover content stored abroad (as well as content stored in the
United States) if that content is held in the account of a U.S. person. For non-
U.S. persons whose content is stored abroad, the government must go through
the MLAT system.'6 While the bill marks an important first step, a closer look
reveals that it does not fully address the flaws of the SCA.
II. RETHINKING THE REACH OF WARRANTS IN THE ERA OF THE
CLOUD
The approach embodied by current proposals for reform, such as the
LEADS Act, is insufficient in an era of rapidly changing technology-in
particular, cloud computing. The Act's limitations reveal the need to adjust the
current focus on territoriality. A warrant regime that hinges on user nationality
and content origination preserves law enforcement's ability to investigate
effectively by securing a warrant of appropriate scope, but creates better
incentives than the current territorial approach and is more attuned to the
commercial and privacy interests at stake.
A. The Weaknesses of the LEADS Approach
Most problematically, the LEADS approach will be unable to keep pace
with advancements in cloud computing. In cloud computing, Internet service
providers move data among different data servers all over the world, rather
than storing data in one physical location. This design is meant to meet users'
needs efficiently and balance burdens on the networks used by providers. Its
benefits are purported to include significant cost savings as well as increased
innovation," and the market for such services is expected to be two hundred
seven billion dollars annually by 2016.'8 Yet if the premise of cloud computing
is a load-balancing system that stores data in different countries at different
points in time, the LEADS Act approach leaves critical questions unanswered
when content belongs to non-U.S. persons. How are we to discern whether a
U.S. warrant can reach the data? Will a U.S. warrant be applicable if the data
was ever stored in the United States? Or is it valid only while the data is stored
16. S. REP. No. 113-34, at 4 (2013); see also LIBERTY & SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra
note ii, at 226.
17. Louis Columbus, Making Cloud Computing Pay, FORBES TECH. (Apr. 10, 2013, 8:01
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2o13/04/1o/making-cloud-computing
-pay-2 [http://perma.cc/K3HA-CKQC]; Quentin Hardy, Computing Goes to the Cloud. So
Does Crime, N.Y. TiMEs: Brrs (Dec. 2, 2014, 9:10 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2o14
/12/02/computing-goes-to-the-cloud-so-does-crime [http://perma.cc/28DC-9DFN].
i8. LIBERTY & SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 11, at 211.
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in the United States? This ambiguity constitutes a critical shortcoming that
will become more acute as the Internet grows more cloud-centered.
Relatedly, when government access to information turns on the physical
location of servers, it increases pressure for data localization mandates. Data
localization laws require companies to store data collected in a country on
servers in that country. Technology companies have vehemently protested such
mandates, emphasizing that localization does not make data more secure and
that it could result in the "effective Balkanization of the Internet and the
creation of a 'splinternet' broken up into smaller national and regional
pieces . . . to replace the global Internet."" Nonetheless, in the post-Snowden
era, many foreign governments have proposed or passed such laws in a
purported effort to protect their citizens from U.S. surveillance.' The
dichotomy set up by the LEADS Act approach will accelerate this trend. It gives
credence to the notion that governments have special ownership over data
stored physically within their borders. In doing so, it encourages foreign
governments to view localization mandates as a mechanism for avoiding time-
consuming and uncertain requests to other countries when their law
enforcement requires access to electronic content.
The impact of this trend is significant. Data localization would severely
threaten the development and use of cloud computing. Forcing companies to
store data on particular servers prevents them from rotating data most
efficiently among servers. Localization would also result in companies
inefficiently building servers in a country that may have high energy costs or
ig. Miller, supra note 2.
20. See, e.g., Allison Grande, Apple's China Data Storage Portends Localization Movement, LAw36o
(Aug. 22, 2014, 5:52 PM), http://www.law36o.com/articles/569841/apple-s-china-data
-storage-portends-localization-movement [http://perma.cc/E35N-UMVA] (China); Allison
Grande, Brazil Nixes Data Localization Mandate from Internet Bill, LAw36o (Mar. 20, 2014,
5:19 PM), http://www.law36o.com/articles/520198/brazil-nixes-data-localization-mandate
-from-internet-bill [http://perma.cc/37DN-6E26] (Brazil); Natalia Gulyaeva et al., Russia
Changes Effective Date of Data Localization Law to September 2o15, HOGAN
LOvELLs CHRON. DATA PROTECTION (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.hldataprotection.com
/2o15/o/articles/international-eu-privacy/russia-changes-effective-date-of-data-localization
-law-to-september-2015 [http://perma.cc/LFL6-2PQ4] (Russia). While many of these
mandates seem to be motivated by governments' desire to increase their own scrutiny of
Internet activity, even France and Germany have proposed the creation of a European
Internet. See Germany, France To Mastermind European Data Network-Bypassing US,
REUTERs (Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.rt.com/news/european-data-protection-network-283
[http://perma.cc/3E5T-CJKB]; Alexander Plaum, The Impact of Forced Data Localisation on
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inadequately trained engineers.' Moreover, it would divide the Internet into
fragmented, national domains, rather than the global commons it has operated
as thus far.' Lastly, localization would make data less secure. By pooling and
storing data in designated physical sites, it creates easy targets for hackers. One
of the virtues of the cloud is that it replaces this static data pooling with a more
dynamic system of storage that is tougher to penetrate."
An additional drawback of the LEADS Act dichotomy is that it creates
incentives for lawbreakers to shift information to the accounts of non-U.S.
persons to avoid process. It is conversely more privacy-protective of non-U.S.
persons than U.S. persons: when data is stored abroad, the former's accounts
are effectively shielded from U.S. law enforcement access but the latter's are
not, even though the individuals may be engaged in the same illicit activity
alongside one another. Given the uncertainty and delays of the MLAT process,
this two-tier system is likely to produce attempts to evade the reach of warrants
by transferring criminal information, such as stolen credit card numbers, to
non-U.S. persons. This approach is also at odds with existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine, which generally requires heightened constitutional
protection for U.S. citizens.'
Lastly, reciprocal application of the LEADS Act framework would be
problematic. If foreign governments adopted the U.S. approach, they could
assert extraterritorial authority over communications by their own citizens that
are stored in the United States. This approach is in tension with the current
procedure, whereby foreign governments requesting data stored in the United
States by U.S. providers must go through the MLAT process.2 s Moreover, it is
unclear what process foreign governments must go through to request their
own citizens' data from foreign providers who happen to store their data in the
21. Bob Butler et al., Cloud Computing Under Siege, FCW (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://fcw.com/articles/2014/o9/12/cloud-under-siege.aspx [http://perma.cc/QP36-XZPU].
22. See Michael Chertoff, The Strategic Significance of the Internet Commons, STRATEGIC STUD. Q,
Summer 2014, at io.
23. Experts also maintain that the cloud is more secure than traditional platforms because data
security hinges not on the location of data, but on elite cybersecurity talent and
comprehensive security protocols, which companies offering sophisticated cloud services,
such as Google and Amazon, are better able to provide. See Robb Allen, Why the Cloud
Can Be More Secure than Your Private Network, DATAPIPE (Mar. 17, 2014), http://
www.datapipe.com/blog/2O14/o3/17/why-the-cloud-can-be-more-secure-than-your-private
-network [http://perma.cc/68WS-S8RR]; Hardy, supra note 17.
24. Compare United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270 (1990) (holding that a
defendant could not invoke the fourth amendment for conduct abroad because he was not a
U.S. citizen), with Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957) (holding that U.S. citizens stationed
abroad were protected by the fifth and sixth amendments).
25. LIBERTY & SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note ii, at 226-27.
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United States. These issues reveal the deeper problem with the privacy regime
in place under the ECPA and as envisioned by the LEADS Act. Conditioning
access to electronic communications on where the data is stored makes little
sense in the era of the cloud. The physical location of data, which could change
at different points in time, is the product of a fairly random technical decision.
While territoriality remains an important variable, the current focus on where
information is stored is misplaced.
B. Reorienting the Focus on Territoriality
In considering territoriality, a more forward-looking approach should focus
on where the user resides and where content is produced. Under such a
framework, the degree of protection accorded to particular electronic content
by the United States would hinge on the nationality of the user and the
location where the content originated -thereby eliminating existing incentives
for localization that dampen progress in cloud computing. U.S. warrants
would be sufficient to require companies to produce requested data regardless
of where it is stored, provided either that the data belongs to a U.S. person or
that the user activity originates in the United States. In contrast, the
government would have to go through the MLAT process to access data
pertaining to non-U.S. nationals that originated abroad. Moreover, the United
States should allow Internet providers to produce content stored in the United
States pursuant to foreign legal process, if such content belongs to the
nationals of that country or if the user activity took place there.' Companies
could opt out of compliance with foreign court orders if they chose, but the
United States should not require that foreign governments go through the
MLAT process and obtain permission under U.S. law, simply because data
otherwise entirely unconnected to the United States happens to be stored
there.
Turning the focus from territoriality - the physical location of the data - to
the nationality of the user and the location of the relevant conduct would track
traditional fault lines in Fourth Amendment law. Namely, U.S. persons
continue to be protected by the Fourth Amendment even when traveling
26. This stands in contrast to other scholars, who have argued for abandoning territoriality, see
Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE. L.J. 326 (2015), or for preserving
territorial distinctions along different metrics, see Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation
Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 373 (2014).
27. Currently, foreign governments requesting data stored in the United States by U.S.
providers must go through the MLAT process. LIBERTY & SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD,
supra note ii, at 226-27.
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abroad," but non-U.S. persons outside U.S. territory do not enjoy such
protections.29 This approach would better reflect the underlying reasons for
according certain individuals or activities privacy rights vis-A-vis the U.S.
government: the individuals are members of a community safeguarded from
such intrusions by its government, or their actions enjoy an expectation of
privacy by virtue of their physical presence in the United States.
Similarly, limiting the scope of warrants in this manner would comport
with foundational principles of international law, particularly respect for state
sovereignty and comity. These principles underlie the longstanding prohibition
on using law enforcement capabilities in another state's territory.30 They
prevent the United States from exercising its police power abroad, even when it
has the capacity to do so. In accordance with these principles, U.S. law
enforcement is forced to rely on mechanisms such as legal assistance treaties
and letters rogatory when relevant evidence or persons are outside U.S.
territory." U.S. law enforcement should be similarly compelled to go through
the MLAT process in order to obtain data belonging to foreign citizens that
originates abroad. This framework would acknowledge that other countries
have a far greater interest in the content of such data, since it pertains to their
nationals or was created on their territory. Just as the United States would not
want a foreign government, which may be far less protective of individual
privacy, to be able to obtain content produced by U.S. nationals on U.S. soil
just because such data happens to be stored on servers abroad, it should refrain
from accessing data produced abroad by foreign nationals simply because it
happens to be stored on U.S. servers. In the long term, then, the principles of
comity and respect for state sovereignty, which compel the United States to
28. See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270 (distinguishing Reid v. Covert on the ground that
the defendant seeking to invoke the Fourth Amendment in this case was not a U.S. citizen);
United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1264 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The Fourth Amendment not
only protects all within our bounds; it also shelters our citizens wherever they may be in the
world from unreasonable searches by our own government.").
29. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75 (holding that "the Fourth Amendment has no
application" to the search by U.S. agents of property owned by a Mexican citizen and
located in Mexico).
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §5 401-04, 432 (AM. LAW INST.
1987). The Permanent Court of International Justice in S.S. Lotus, a seminal international
law case, stated that "the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a
State is that- failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not exercise
its power in any form in the territory of another State." S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment,
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. io, at 18 (Sept. 7).
31. CHARLEs DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL94-166, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 22-25 (2012).
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limit the reach of its warrants in the manner described, also provide greater
protection to U.S. nationals.
This approach is admittedly imperfect. For one, lingering challenges would
remain for those accounts that could not be traced or identified, such as
anonymized IP addresses. However, Internet geolocation technology, which
aims to pinpoint the physical location of Internet users or devices, has grown
increasingly sophisticated in recent years." Internet providers use IP-address-
based geolocation techniques in conjunction with others, such as collecting the
time it takes for a device to respond to pings or analyzing the manner in which
it routes information, which has improved accuracy." While extremely savvy
users could potentially still avoid being traced, recent developments have made
avoiding detection far more technologically challenging.3 Consequently, there
is a low likelihood that a datastream would be so obscured that Internet
providers could not provide a rough estimate as to its origins.
Another potential problem with this approach is that reciprocal application
could result in the disclosure of sensitive communications to hostile
governments, without the protections of the U.S. judicial process.3s Yet in the
long term, requiring countries to go through the U.S. legal process when data
is stored in the United States, even though they may have a far greater interest
in the content, is counterproductive. Reciprocal application of this requirement
entrenches an outdated notion of territoriality that could leave U.S. citizens'
user data vulnerable to information requests from less-protective regimes. It
also increases the pressure for localization mandates and threatens the
development of the cloud, which offers more security than traditional
computing." Preserving the current approach would therefore make data less
secure. Moreover, the concern with reciprocal application will be increasingly
less salient as cloud computing grows and data rotates among servers around
the world. It is also important to bear in mind that the United States already
has legal assistance agreements with countries such as Russia and China,
32. See Riva Richmond, We Know Where You Are, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 29, 2008), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB122227759888771725 [http://perma.cc/S7QW-ZZSV].
33. James A. Muir & Paul C. van Oorschot, Internet Geolocation: Evasion and Counterevasion,
ACM COMPUTING SURvEYs, Dec. 2009, at 1, 8-1o; see Marketa Trimble, The Future of
Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
&ENT. L.J. 567, 592-97 (2012).
34. See Muir & van Oorschot, supra note 33, at i; Jamie Taylor et al., Bringing Location to IP
Addresses with IP Geolocation, 4 J. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES WEB INTELLIGENCE 273 (2012).
3s. The paradigmatic example of this undesirable situation is an illiberal regime requesting data
belonging to a human rights activist from that country, in which the user activity originated
abroad but the data happens to be stored on servers in the United States.
36. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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pursuant to which it frequently exchanges information and evidence in the
nonelectronic context.17 The vast majority of this cooperation involves run-of-
the-mill investigations, in which such exchange is mutually beneficial and
poses little concern -as is likely to be the case in the electronic context as well.38
In short, the existing legal regime governing the reach of warrants was not
designed with technological innovations such as the cloud in mind. Rather, it
creates undesirable incentives for a "splinternet." Shifting the focus to the
nationality of the user and where the content originates would better prepare
the legal framework to accommodate further developments in cloud
computing. Further, this approach would strike a balance between law
enforcement and privacy that both tracks the Fourth Amendment's protections
and comports with international law.
III. ENCRYPTION: WHEN WARRANTS ARE NOT ENOUGH
Updating U.S. legal infrastructure to keep up with new technologies does
not end with revising the ECPA. A clearly valid warrant is no longer sufficient
for law enforcement to obtain requested data. In order to ensure the
effectiveness of the warrant regime, then, legislation should compel companies
to maintain decryption capabilities but impose stricter minimization
requirements.
A. Trending Toward Noncooperation
As the relationship between Washington and major U.S. technology
companies has grown more contentious, companies have not only declined to
cooperate with the government unless mandated by a court order, but they
have also accelerated efforts to more heavily encrypt data-both when it is
37. See Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, China-U.S., June 19, 2000,
T.I.A.S. No. 13,102; Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Russ.-U.S.,
June 17, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. No. 1o6-22; see also BRUCE ZAGARIS, INTERNATIONAL WHITE
COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 275-93 (2010); Anna MacCormack, The United States,
China, and Extradition: Ready for the Next Step?, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 445 (2012).
38. See, e.g., BUREAU OF INT'L NARcOTICS & LAw ENF'T, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 197 (2olo), http://www.state.gov/documents/org
anization/137411.pdf [http://perma.cc/M68N-UE28] (describing U.S.-China cooperation to
combat drug trafficking); Duncan DeVille, Prosecuting Russian Organized Crime Cases, 3 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 493 (zoo2).
553
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
stored in servers and as it moves among them.39 In general, the U.S.
government should welcome this development. Encrypting electronic
communications makes data more secure, making it harder for hackers and
cybercriminals to infiltrate. Yet technology companies have gone further. In
September 2014, Apple and Google announced that their new systems would
encrypt content on mobile phones in a manner that makes it impossible for the
companies themselves to access the data on locked phones.4o Facebook and
WhatsApp followed with similar announcements, spurring investment in
companies promising even more sophisticated end-to-end encryption.4 '
The implications for law enforcement are significant. Under Apple's iOS 8
mobile operating system, for instance, data on iPhones is by default encrypted
once users set a passcode. Once this  done, Apple is technologically unable to
access the encrypted data, even when served with a warrant. In prior systems,
by contrast, law enforcement officials with court orders could send iPhones to
Apple's headquarters for engineers to recover the requested data.4 Under the
new systems, data that is backed up on iCloud servers and retained by third
parties, such as call logs, would still be accessible to law enforcement.43 Yet it is
not difficult to imagine that a few years down the road, such stored data will
soon be encrypted in this manner as well.
The possibility of decreasing access to data, particularly data that an Article
III court has determined with probable cause contains evidence of a crime, has
engendered strong criticism from the law enforcement community." High-
39. David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Internet Giants Erect Barriers to Spy Agencies, N.Y. TIMES
(June 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2ol4/o6/o7/technology/internet-giants-erect
-barriers-to-spy-agencies.html [http://perma.cc/XWG2-BA3V].
40. Devlin Barrett & Danny Yadron, New Level of Smartphone Encryption Alanns
Law Enforcement, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-level
-of-smartphone-encryption-alarms-law-enforcement-1411420341 [http://perma.cc/M4DN
-VCCP].
41. Tom Fox-Brewster, WhatsApp Adds End to End Encryption Using TextSecure,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2ol4/nov/19
/whatsapp-messaging-encryption-android-ios [http://perma.cc/BP6Q-QN8U]; Amrita
Jayakumar, Encryption Company Silent Circle, Creator of Blackphone, Raises
$3o Million, WASH. POST (May 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/busi
ness/capitalbusiness/encryption-company-silent-circle-creator-of-blackphone-raises-30-mill
ion/2014/o5/21/of9fo820-e103-ne3-8dc-d6b7fedeo8la-story.html [http://perma.cc/639J
-9N 74 ]; Tom Risen, Facebook Email Encryption Another Blow to Surveillance, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (June 2, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2ol5/o6/o2/facebook
-email-encryption-another-blow-to-surveillance [http://perma.cc/QBX9-EVDT].
42. Barrett & Yadron, supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. See Craig Timberg & Greg Miller, FBI Blasts Apple, Google for Locking Police out of Phones,
WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2o4
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level officials, including the President, have exerted significant pressure on
companies to modify such systems;"s yet technology companies have remained
steadfast.,6
In light of the growing standoff, there are several options available to the
United States. First, the government can attempt to persuade companies to
drop their use of inaccessible systems. Recent developments, however, indicate
that reliance on informal methods of cooperation between the government and
companies is no longer sufficient.' Alternatively, law enforcement could rely
solely on compelled decryption, whereby an individual served with a court
order can be compelled to enter the passcode for his or her smartphone or be
prosecuted for contempt of court. This route, though, applies only to situations
in which the relevant individual can be tracked down, and raises Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination concerns.*8 Another option is to pass legislation
that requires companies to retain decryption ability so as to be responsive to
law enforcement requests, with noncompliant companies facing an escalating
series of fines. In the long run, this option is likely to be the most efficacious.49
/09/25/68c4eo8e-4344-iie4-9ax5-137aao153527_story.html [http://perma.cc/2QLD-EKE2];
Chris Strohm, New York Prosecutor Calls for Law To Fight Apple Data Encryption, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 6, 2015, 5:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o15-0-o6/new-york
-prosecutor-calls-for-law-to-fight-apple-data-encryption [http://perma.cc/6HNF-SCH6].
45. Allison Grande, Obama Bashes Plans To Block Police Access to User Data, LAw36o (Jan.
16, 2015, 5:43 PM), http://www.law36o.com/articles/612572/obama-bashes-plans-to-block
-police-access-to-user-data [http://perma.cc/FF2K-QZDP].
46. Danny Yadron, Google's Schmidt Fires Back over Encryption, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 8,
2014), http://www.wsj.comVarticles/googles-schmidt-says-encrypted-phones-wont-thwart
-police-14128i218o [http://perma.cc/7W34-BH2H].
47. Del QuentinWilber, U.S. Seeks To Reverse Apple-Android Data-Locking Decision, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 30, 2014, 12:oo AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o14-09-30/u-s
-seeks-to-reverse-apple-android-data-locking-decision [http://perma.cc/LA8H-2HB8].
48. Hanni Fakhoury, Fifth Amendment Prohibits Compelled Decryption, New EFF Brief Argues,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/203/lo/new
-eff-amicus-brief-argues-fifth-amendment-prohibits-compelled-decryption [http://perma
.cc/7ED6-XNCX] (arguing that law enforcement cannot force a crime suspect to decrypt his
computer because doing so violates the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination).
49. Such a response would be in accord with the response of other countries, such as the United
Kingdom. Chloe Albanesius, U.K. Prime Minister Wants To Ban Encrypted Messaging, PC
MAG. (Jan. 13, 2015, 10:25 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/o,2817,2475o69,oo.asp
[http://perma.cc/5U4W-3SLL].
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B. Possibilities for Legislative Reform
As the cloud and peer-to-peer communications platforms become more
heavily trafficked and more vulnerable to criminal activity,so accessing data on
such platforms will be increasingly critical to defeating criminal and terrorist
activity. Currently, prosecution is the only recourse for the government when
confronting recalcitrant technology companies. The government is often
understandably reluctant to pursue this option, so as not to jeopardize
cooperation in other domains and for fear of collateral consequences.
Therefore, legislation that requires Internet providers to retain the ability to
decrypt communications when served with warrants and imposes fines for
failure to do so would be a less severe mechanism to engender cooperation. At
the same time, the penalties would give teeth to the government's current
entreaties, which are increasingly ignored.
Undoubtedly, any such legislation will face resistance from technology
companies and NGOs, who will likely denounce it as an effort by the U.S.
government to obtain a "backdoor" to user communications." Such allegations
seem to be driven by the similarities between this proposed measure and the
1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).s 2 The
Act requires that all phone companies design their systems to provide an
opening for government wiretaps and was amended in 200S to apply to
broadband and certain Internet phone services. This same Act could be further
amended to bring Internet service providers and certain social media sites
within its purview, with a critical distinction. Unlike the 1994 Act, any effort to
obtain law enforcement access to encrypted data does not and should not
require a back door. Rather than forcing companies to build in openings that
the government is aware of and can exploit, any legislation should allow
technology companies to design systems in a way that maximizes data security,
so long as they retain their own ability to decrypt when required by court order.
so. See Ellen Nakashima, Prolhferation of New Online Communications Services Poses Hurdles for
Law Enforcement, WASH. POST (July 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/national-security/proliferation-of-new-online-communications-services-poses-hurdles-for
-law-enforcement/2o4/o7/25/645b13aa-od2l-ne4-b8e5-dode8o767fc2 story.html [http://
perma.ccAD8V-ZYNC]; Hardy, supra note 17.
51. See, e.g., Allison Grande, Wyden Again Floats Bill To Bar Backdoor Access to User Data,
LAw360 (Jan. 9, 2015, 5:38 PM), http://www.law36o.com/articles/6o9913/wyden-again
-floats-bill-to-bar-backdoor-access-to-user-data [http://perma.cc/RX9F-89TY]; Jake
Laperruque, Tales from Decrypt: FBI Wants Backdoors and Ability To Compel Access, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Oct. 17, 2014), http://cdt.org/blog/tales-from-decrypt-fbi-wants
-backdoors-and-ability-to-compel-access [http://perma.cc/3ZQA-6SY4].
52. 47 U.S.C. §5 1001-1010 (2012) (amended 2005).
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Even with the caveat that neither the United States nor any other
government will possess a back door to access user content, such a proposal is
sure to trigger some alarm. Yet the recent passage of the USA Freedom Act
suggests that the political space and impetus exist to make enacting
compromise reform measures of this kind possible.s' Moreover, a carefully
crafted statute could mitigate backlash. First, any legislative requirement of this
kind should allow for a reasonable implementation period, perhaps twelve to
twenty-four months. To be sure, requiring an opening in an encryption
algorithm inevitably creates an entry point that can also potentially be
exploited by nefarious actors.' (The other alternative, companies maintaining
a "vault" of passwords that can later be accessed, has similar vulnerabilities.)
However, allowing companies to develop opportunities for future interception
when designing systems at the outset, rather than seeking to amend already-
complete encryption algorithms to create an opening, would allow engineers to
better secure such gaps.
Perhaps most importantly, any legislative reform, both with respect to the
ECPA and encryption for law enforcement, should include strict minimization
requirements.5 The SCA includes no such limitations. Once the government
serves Internet providers with a warrant for the communications content of a
particular account, it is essentially free to sift through all of the available
content in that account.s6 In contrast, when accessing communications from
traditional phone companies under the CALEA, a government actor must tailor
the search and screen communications and limit disclosure so that only
relevant files are transferred to other agents.' Minimization would work
differently in the electronic context than in the telephone context, but could be
implemented just as effectively. Certain default metrics could be devised to
trim the scope of access initially granted to government officials, based on
factors such as the duration of communications, the time when the
53. USA Freedom Act: What's in, What's out, WASH. POST (June 2, 2015), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/usa-freedom-act [ht p://perma.cc/EJM5-67YJ].
54. See Nakashima, supra note 50.
s. Minimization requirements mandate that government officials implement procedures to
limit the collection, retention, and dissemination of private information. These provisions
can vary significantly in scope and detail. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. S 18o(h) (2012) (concerning
minimization procedures under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act). See generally
Clifford S. Fishman, The "Minimization" Requirement in Electronic Surveillance: Title III, the
Fourth Amendment, and the Dread Scott Decision, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 315 (1978).
56. See Kerr, supra note 26, at 384; Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1701, 1723-24, 1739 (2004).
57. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192,
1202 ( 9 th Cir. 2002).
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communications were made, and the number of other actors involved. From
there, an initial law enforcement official could perform discretionary filtering
to screen content and pass along only that which meets a threshold of
relevance, which could vary based on the severity of the crime or investigation
in question. Together, these provisions would balance law enforcement's
informational needs with users' privacy interests in a more nuanced manner.
Moreover, in spite of the inevitable initial backlash, such reforms are
actually in the commercial interests of technology companies. Foreign
customers have been suspicious of cooperation between U.S. companies and
the government in part because their collaboration has been so furtive. By
passing legislative reforms, the United States could make clear that the era of
"secret cooperation" is over. Any disclosure by U.S. companies to the U.S.
government will be the product of court orders, with the scope of such
disclosure delineated by statute. This openness would arguably do more to
assuage foreign and domestic consumer concerns than the acrimony of the past
year.
The current trend in encryption has made securing a warrant insufficient
for law enforcement to access electronic content. Legislation that requires
companies to retain decryption ability, but institutes strict minimization
requirements, is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of an updated warrant
system, albeit in a manner that is sensitive to individual privacy and
commercial interests.
CONCLUSION
Technological advancements, particularly the cloud and encryption, will
soon render our current legal frameworks outdated. Preserving the balance
between security and privacy in the context of law enforcement therefore
requires updating our warrant regime to better align the incentives of
government, technology companies, and individual consumers.
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Susan Rose-Ackerman, BA., Ph.D., Henry R. Luce Professor offurisprudence (Law School and Department of Political
Science)
Jed Rubenfeld, A.B., J.D., Robert R. Slaughter Professor ofLaw
David E. Schizer, M.A., J.D., Florence Rogatz Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring term)
David N. Schleicher, M.Sc., J.D., Associate Professor ofLaw
Peter H. Schuck, MA., J.D., LL.M., SimeonE. Baldwin ProfessorEmeritus ofLaw
Vicki Schultz, B.A., J.D., Ford Foundation Professor ofLaw and Social Sciences
t Alan Schwartz, B.S., LL.B., SterlingProfessor fLaw
Ian Shapiro, J.D., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (fall term)
t ScottJ. Shapiro, J.D., Ph.D., CharlesF. Southmayd Professor ofLaw and Professor ofPhilosophy
Robert J. Shiller, BA., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (fallterm)
Reva Siegel, M.Phil., J.D., Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor ofLaw
James J. Silk, MA., J.D., Clinical Professor ofLaw
John G. Simon, L.B., LL.D., Augustus E. Lines ProfessorEmeritus ofLaw and Professorial Lecturer in Law
Lawrence M. Solan, Ph.D., J.D., Sidley Austin -Robert D. McLean Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring tern)
Edward Stein, Ph.D., J.D., Maurice R. Greenberg Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring term)
t Kate Stith, M.P.P., J.D., Lafayette S. FosterProfessor fLaw
Alec Stone Sweet, M.A., Ph.D., LeitnerProfessorofInternational L w, Politics, and International Studies (fall term)
Mike K. Thompson, M.B.A., J.D.,Associate Dean
Tom R. Tyler, M.A., Ph.D., Macklin FlemingProfessor fLaw and Professor ofPsychology
Patrick Weil, M.BA, Ph.D., Visiting Professor ofLaw and OsarM RuebhausenDistinguished Senior Fdlow (fa lltenn)
James QWhitman, J.D., Ph.D., Ford Foundation Professor ofComparative and Foreign Law
t Michael J. Wishnie, B.A., J.D., Deputy Dean for Experiential Education, William 0. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law, and
Director, Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization
* John FabianWitt, J.D., Ph.D., Allen H. Dufy Class ofa96o Professor ofLaw
Stephen Wizner, A.B., J.D., William 0. Douglas Clinical ProfessorEmeritus ofLaw and ProfessorialLecturerin Law
* GideonY affe, A.B., Ph.D., Professor ofLaw and Professor ofPhilosophy
Taisu Zhang, J.D., Ph.D., Irving S. RibicoffVisitingAssociate Professor ofLaw (fall term)
Howard V. Zonana, B.A., M.D., Professor ofPsychiatry and Clinical Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (spring term)
* On leave ofabsence, 2015-2016.
t On leave of absence, fall term, 2015.
* On leave of absence, spring term, 2016.
LECTURERS IN LAW
Sarah Baumgartel, A.B., J.D.
Emily Bazelon, BA., J.D.
Brian Logan Beirne, B.S., J.D.
Tessa Bialek, B.A., J.D.
Jeremy L. Daum, B.S., J.D.
Gregg Gonsalves, B.S.
Linda Greenhouse, B.A., M.S.L., Joseph Goldstein Lecturer in Law
Su Lin Han, MA, J.D.
Stephen Latham, J.D., Ph.D.
James Ponet, MA., D.D.
Megan Quattlebaum, B.A., J.D.
Michael Ulrich, J.D., M.P.H.
Graham Webster, B.S., A.M.
Robert D. Williams, B.A., J.D.
VISITING LECTURERS IN LAW
Guillermo Aguilar-Alvarez, Lic. en Derecho (J.D.)
Catherine Ashton, B.Sc.
Yas Banifatemi, Ph.D., LL.M.
Mark Barnes, J.D., LL.M.
Stephen B. Bright, B.A., J.D., Harvey Karp Visiting Lecturer in Law
Lincoln Caplan, B.A., J.D., Truman Capote Visiting Lecturer in Law
Timothy Collins, BA., M.B.A.
Victoria A. Cundiff, B.A., J.D.
Brian T. Daly, MA., J.D.
Eugene R. Fidell, B.A., LL.B., Florence Rogatz Visiting Lecturer in Law
Gregory Fleming, B.A., J.D.
Lawrence J. Fox, B.A., J.D., George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Lee Gelernt, M.Sc., J.D.
Peter T. Grossi, Jr., M.A., J.D.
Menaka Guruswamy, LL.M., D.Phil., Peter and Patricia Gruber Fellow in Globaljustice
David L. Harfst, B.A., J.D.
Frank lacobucci, LL.B., LL.M., Gruber Global Constitutionalism Fellow
Jeffrey A. Meyer, BA., J.D.
Andrew J. Pincus, B.A., J.D.
Stephen Preston, B.A., J.D., Oscar M. Ruebhausen Distinguished Senior Fellow
Richard Ravitch, B.A., LL.B.
Eric S. Robinson, M.B.A., J.D.
Charles A. Rothfeld, A.B., J.D.
John M. Samuels, J.D., IL.M., George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Paul Schwaber, M.A., Ph.D.
Michael S. Solender, B.A., J.D.
Jacob J. Sullivan, M.Phil., J.D., Oscar M. Ruebhausen Distinguished Senior Fellow in National Security
Robert Sussman, B.A., LL.D.
Stefan R. Underhill, B.A., J.D.
John M. Walker, Jr., B.A., J.D., George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Megan A. Wulff, M.P.H., J.D.
David M. Zornow, BA., J.D.
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